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Now that marginal, populistic rhetoric have en-
tered into the public discourse of long-term de-
mocracies and states with mature political cul-
tures, it cannot be said anymore that populism is 
an anomaly or the characteristic of unstable pe-
ripheral states. Populism is one of the concepts 
which have marked political debates during the 
last few years and it is no surprise that confusion 
has emerged regarding the meaning of this con-
cept. Populism has been associated with Trump 
and Sanders, Brexit and the British Labour Par-
ty since 2015., Syriza and Golden Dawn, Occupy 
and Tea Party Movement, Mélenchon and Marine 
Le Pen, and Putin and Chávez. When xenopho-
bia, anti-elitism, nationalism, anti-globalism, cri-
tiques of austerity politics, claims to participato-
ry democracy and the more equal distribution of 
wealth are all inserted into the same rubric, there 
is the threat that every appeal to the public good 
and confronting status quo politics is identified 
with populism.
The good news is that Jan-Werner Müller’s book 
What is Populism? has been published just in time, 
and to considerable extent clears this confusion, 
sheds light on the character of populistic move-
ments and parties (chapter one), explicates the mo-
dus operandi of populistic regimes (chapter two) 
and offers instructions for democratic responses 
to such politics (chapter three).1 The very title of 
the introductory chapter “Is Everyone a Populist?” 
suggests that it needs to be determined what or 
whom the concept of populism refers to. One of 
the basic characteristics of populistic movements 
is the critique of elites as “alienated” from the peo-
ple, but anti-elitism as such is not characteristic of 
populism only, nor are populist parties non-elitists 
unconditionally. The critique of elites as “alien-
ated” from the people is one of the main traits of 
populist movements, albeit not sufficiently dis-
tinctive condition of populism, considering not all 
critiques of elite is in a name of the fiction of “real” 
people. Moreover, populist leaders can claim that 
they reject the elites which are acting against the 
people’s interests, dissociate themselves from the 
people and do not hear their voice. The very same 
leaders of such movements are quite often part of 
these elites, as well rival elites are denounced as 
unrepresentative, corrupt, untrustworthy, and 
treacherous. In contrast, non-populist critiques 
1 The addendum of the book consists of Müller’s concise 
summary, that is the main tenets of the book in the form 
of seven theses on populism. 
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of elites advocate replacement of political repre-
sentatives without labelling them as morally cor-
rupt or deviant. While the latter critique is aimed 
at minority which does not respect the common 
good but advocates particular interests, and thus 
opposes the demands and interests of the major-
ity and other social groups, the former critique 
stigmatizes the representatives of legislative, ex-
ecutive and juridical power as enemies.2
Populism promises the impossible and oversimpli-
fies the complex issues, which is the reason why it 
is often used interchangeably with “demagoguery” 
(p. 11). Also, it generally coalesces with national-
ism, as both of them are negatively charged: any 
positive politics, if they are elaborated at all, could 
be brought about only through “negative” politics 
oriented against particular groups. As the primary 
aim of nationalism, demagoguery and populism 
is deliverance from and neutralization of some-
body (contested elite, racial, ethnic or any other 
social group), psychologically they express “fear”, 
“anger”, “frustration” and “resentment”.
Müller, however, avoids identifying populism ex-
clusively with these negative psychological stances, 
as well as with politics which exclusion is the only 
content, such as xenophobia and nationalism. The 
latter two are the most toxic embodiment of pop-
ulism, but not the only ones. In the sense in which 
populism is “positive”, it is “a particular moralis-
tic imagination of politics” (p. 19), which assumes 
moral purity of the people. Intruders’ inauthen-
tic influences, along with alienated political and 
professional elites, are obstacles to “people’s will”. 
The singularity of this will is the basic premise of 
populism, as it always has a firm anti-pluralistic 
stance. The populists claim that they and only they 
represent the true people (p. 40), but this claim 
presupposes the existence of “the people” with a 
homogeneous will. Therefore, the imagined object 
as ontologically unified and axiologically affirma-
tive precedes empirical determination of what or 
who the people are as a social or political group, 
which values this group endorses, whether their 
interests are mutually compatible etc. The pop-
ulists argue they are symbolic representation of 
“the real people” (p. 27, 102), and as a consequence 
2 The pro-brexit Daily Mail, which can be marked as a 
populist newspaper, denounced on its front page judge’s 
ruling there should be parliamentary oversight of Brexit 
as “Enemies of the people”, a term which is unusual in 
debates between opponents in democratic societies and 
which appears to be more an invitation to lynch than a 
statement. 
they are prone to nullify any electoral success by 
rival party and to ascribe its victory to manipu-
lation. If the rival party gains a majority of vote, 
that only means that it gained it by deception and 
fraudulence and, as that party does not represent 
the “real people”, its legitimacy is null and void 
notwithstanding the number of votes.
But populism shares a symbolic construction of 
“the real people” with National-socialism and 
Stalinism which envisaged a singular nation in 
the form of Ein Volk or a working class coalesced 
with the party. Nevertheless, populism can com-
fortably use democratic procedures and all dem-
ocratic means without their abolition. Rigged and 
unfair elections do not imply that the system has 
diverged towards totalitarianism as long as the 
opposition’s accession to power is not precluded 
systematically. This is the reason why a situation 
where populistic leadership aims to change the 
constitution or electoral rules and consistently 
restrict freedom of the media is more sinister than 
in populist regimes which are reluctant to do so.3
The fact that makes populism more elusive is the 
absence of a codified doctrine on which it might 
rely, so it is more akin to an assembly of eclectical 
practices than to a coherent political stance (p. 10-
11). As has been said, the opponents of political 
pluralism are prone to accept democratic rules, 
and therefore the threat to democracy does not 
come from a theoretical conception or ideology 
which renounces democracy and abjure the idea 
of parliamentary representation (in contrast to 
Nazism and fascism, there is no populists’ Carl 
Schmitt or Giovanni Gentile), but from within – 
from politicians and parties appealing to the very 
ideals of democracy, arguing that existing parties 
3 Populistic regimes are reluctant to slip into plain au-
thoritarianism – to suspend all separation of power, inde-
pendent oversight of the government and all democratic 
procedures – not only fearing the loss of international 
reputation, as Muller assumed (p. 50), but also because of 
the fact that democracy is the overwhelmingly accepted 
normative condition of legitimacy of governance. In virtue 
of fear of losing the justification of its governance, populist 
regimes are constrained to abide by the rules of democra-
cy, notwithstanding their unwillingness to accept the rules 
and attempts to circumvent them. In scrutinizing the fall 
of Milošević and his regime as a result of uprising on 5th 
October 2000, the fact of his previous losing the election 
on 24. September – which was procedurally correct albeit 
far from being conducted in fair conditions – is often 
overlooked. The consequent mass demonstrations just 
complemented and completed the change of power, and 
so-called Fifth of October revolution was a revolt against 
the populist regime’s attempt to subvert democratic rules.
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and elites actually suppress bottom up potentials 
and the desire to change of the people.
Furthermore, not all anti-pluralism is also popu-
lism. Bolsheviks and religious fanatics do not claim 
that the majority or the people are  morally impec-
cable, likewise they are not in favor of  democratic 
rules. In contrast to them, populists, as Müller ar-
gued, are not against representative democracy, 
as long as it represents the right people (p. 25). 
But, the idea of representation in parliamentary 
democracy consists principally of the fact that 
what is represented is a particular group of peo-
ple, not the whole nation or people as such. The 
representatives of an agrarian community would 
not have the same standpoint, interests and aspi-
rations as the representatives of an urban district; 
the representatives of an area which is ecological-
ly in peril most likely would be in conflict with 
those of business orientated city and so on. These 
examples might look like platitudes, but they re-
veal the absurdity of the idea that some person or 
group can have the ability to harmonize all those 
interests perfectly. Consequently, the idea of de-
mocracy endorsed by populists is different from 
the representative version and is akin to a con-
sensus of unencumbered persons stripped from 
their particular stances.
This lead us to the paradoxical position of popu-
lism: it promulgates unification on the one hand, 
and unbridgeable polarization into “us” and “them” 
on the other. This confirms Müller’s thesis that 
the unity of the people is not empirical, but fic-
titious “moral unification” or “corpus mysticum”, 
and, in addition, goes along with the quest for 
internal enemies who distort the preestablished 
unity. This leads some critics to conclude that 
unconstructivity and contradictions of populist 
politics have, as a consequence, the inability of 
populist parties to govern. In the second part of 
the book this thesis has been reconsidered by ex-
amining the questions could those parties gov-
ern, even write a constitution, and operate within 
the scope of a democratic framework. Although 
Müller’s answer is affirmative, considering that 
populists in some cases are not opponents of the 
separation of powers and representative democ-
racy (simultaneously attempting to rig the system 
to their advantage as much as possible), he denies 
the democratic character of populist parties and 
movements. Because populism is anti-pluralistic 
by its nature, the term “illiberal democracy” does 
not denote populist regimes adequately: popu-
lism fundamentally distorts democracy (p. 49-60). 
Even when it attempts to play by rules, it is not 
the friend, but the foe of democracy: populism is 
neither corrective of liberal democracy, nor a path 
to participation in politics (p. 102, 103.).
Prior to their ascent to power, populist parties em-
phasize the “people‘s will” which preexists along-
side political processes but, because of manifold 
impediments (although less “objective” concern-
ing existing laws, institutions or constitutions, and 
more “subjective” such as the usurpation of the 
elites or particular groups), this will has not been 
affirmed; and when it gains power, a populist party 
acts as if this party leadership is  representative of 
the people‘s will. The authoritarian character of 
the populist party stems almost inevitably from 
the claim to represent 100 % of the people. As long 
as pluralism is denied and disagreement excluded, 
the good for all must be recognized in a unique 
way. The subject who recognizes it is the leader 
(p. 32-38). Consequently, it is very difficult to dis-
empower the party claimed to be infallible and the 
same leadership (most often one person) tends to 
be in power for the long term. As the leadership 
is personalized, along with leader’s losing power, 
the whole political system collapses.
The claim of the populistic parties to more di-
rect democracy and political participation of the 
masses could appear as justified, but those claims 
are only rhetorical: in reality, populism rejects full 
representation of different social groups, as well 
as the principle of supersedence of government. 
According to Müller, populism should be treated 
as a symptom of the crises of democracy and the 
treatment of the voters for populist parties as ir-
rational, lead by frustration, xenophobic, bigoted 
and resentful is inappropriate for a liberal-dem-
ocratic approach. In the same vein, by the very 
exclusion of populistic groups or parties from 
the public sphere, this approach falls to one more 
contradiction: pluralism is negated in the name 
of pluralism (p. 83). In this way problem with the 
treatment of illiberal minorities in liberal societ-
ies are perpetuated: if illiberal minorities should 
be excluded, that implies liberal group‘s toler-
ance can be applied only to the groups which are 
alike them, which is in collision with the defini-
tion of tolerance.
The avoidance of the paradox means we should be 
under “an obligation to engage them /populists/” 
(p. 84), as populism is, metaphorically speaking, 
the permanent shadow of modern representative 
democracy, and a constant danger to it (p. 11, 15, 
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101). As it is impossible to escape one’s own shadow, 
populism is inevitable, but it can be of the greatest 
importance in pointing to antidemocratic and an-
tirepublican impulses stemming from it, in which 
Müller’s analysis, as well as practical instructions 
on how to deal with populism, is highly useful. It 
is always necessary to warn of the point at which 
populism is converted to autocracy: controlling 
the media, adjusting the constitution, marginal-
izing genuine opposition and establishing ficti-
tious ones (which are loyal to the government), 
constraining the right to demonstrate, spread-
ing fake news, threatening the independent me-
dia and intellectuals, banning non-government 
organizations, overt plain “politics of enmity”.4 
Populism operates in the “grey zone” in which 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Maybe this tendency to authoritarianism, which is 
inherent to populism, could resolve tension in Müller’s 
analysis, when he claims that “National Socialism and 
Italian Fascism need to be understood as populist move-
ments” (p. 93) and “populism is only thinkable in the 
context of representative democracy” (p. 77). 
it is occasionally difficult to discern what are fair 
democratic process, and what is just appreciation 
of procedure in biased conditions, what is free-
dom of the media, and what is their abuse, what is 
participation of the citizen, and what is manipula-
tion of voters. With Müller‘s books we are getting 
up-to-date critique, the response to the  challenges 
which now emerge in almost  every elections in 
almost every democratic society. Although those 
who are looking for remedies or political solu-
tions will remain disappointed: as Müller shows 
on numerous examples, populism will not be re-
futed by pointing to its theoretical flaws, but it 
could be discredited through disentanglement 
of its assortment of vacuous promises, pompous 
rhetoric and shoddy practices.
